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We discuss quantum position verification (QPV) protocols in which the verifiers create and send
single-qubit states to the prover. QPV protocols using single-qubit states are known to be insecure
against adversaries that share a small number of entangled qubits. We introduce QPV protocols
that are practically secure: they only require single-qubit states from each of the verifiers, yet their
security is broken if the adversaries sharing an impractically large number of entangled qubits employ
teleportation-based attacks. These protocols are a modification of known QPV protocols in which
we include a classical random oracle without altering the amount of quantum resources needed by
the verifiers. We present a cheating strategy that requires a number of entangled qubits shared
among the adversaries that grows exponentially with the size of the classical input of the random
oracle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that a security organization would like to
identify the position of its spy in a secure location, who
could possibly be surrounded by adversaries, before ini-
tiating any distant private communication. The security
organization could execute a protocol whose task is to use
the spatial position of the spy as its only credential that
has to be verified by the organization. In general, there
are situations, such as in position-based cryptography
[1, 2], in which it is in the interest of the collaborating
parties to authenticate their positions before initiating
any secure communication. Protocols to achieve such a
task are often called position verification.
In the task of position verification, we assume that a
prover P is located at a fixed spatial position pos. There
is a set {Vi}K−1i=0 of K verifiers located at different po-
sitions. A time-bound interactive protocol is allowed to
run between the verifiers and the prover in order for the
prover to convince the verifiers of his position creden-
tial. All the verifiers can communicate privately among
themselves and collectively agree on items that each in-
dividual verifier would send to the prover along with the
task that the prover has to perform. The prover is ex-
pected to send the information obtained at the end of
the task performed on the received items within the time
limit set by the verifiers, which is typically equal to the
time that a signal would take to travel from pos to the
farthest verifier.
In this paper, we discuss quantum position verification
(QPV) protocols in which the verifiers and the prover
employ quantum strategies against adversaries capable of
quantum attacks. Our goal is to develop QPV schemes
∗ sidddas@ulb.ac.be
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that are practically secure: while the verifiers use a
few qubits, the adversaries need an exponentially large
amount of resources (shared entanglement and quantum
computational power) to break the security of the pro-
tocol. The important point to note is that the entangle-
ment distribution over long distances and the storage of
entangled qubits are technologically challenging (cf. with
Refs. [3, 4]) which limit the attacking capability of the
adversaries. In this sense, we state that the schemes we
have presented are technologically feasible and practi-
cally secure.
In 1993, Brands and Chaum [1] introduced the “dis-
tance bounding” technique in the classical setting by tim-
ing the delay between sending out of a challenge bit from
a verifier to the prover and receiving back the corre-
sponding response bit. If the speed of communication
is bounded by the speed of light, this technique gives an
upper bound on the distance between the prover and the
verifier. These ideas were extended in Ref. [2] (in the
classical setting) to what is now known as position veri-
fication. In particular, in the so-called “Vanilla model”,
the prover is located at a position pos that lies inside
the tetrahedron enclosed by the verifiers. In this model,
there is always a possibility that a group of adversaries
can collectively disguise themselves as the honest prover
by convincing the verifiers of being located at pos even
when they are all positioned elsewhere. It is assumed
that an adversary can locally store all information she
receives, and at the same time share this information
with other colluding adversaries located elsewhere. This
impossibility result rules out the existence of a secure po-
sition verification protocol under classical settings even
when one makes computational hardness assumptions on
the adversaries [2, 5].
A natural question that arises is whether there exists a
secure position verification protocol in the quantum set-
ting. One early position-based cryptography protocol in
the quantum setting is quantum tagging, first discussed
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2in 2002 and described in a 2006 patent, Ref. [6]. Quan-
tum tagging is the task of authenticating the location of
a classical tagging device by sending and receiving quan-
tum signals from distant sites. It is assumed that ad-
versaries control the environment, and that their quan-
tum information processing and transmitting power is
unbounded. In Ref. [7], several schemes for the quantum
tagging task were described, and their security breach us-
ing quantum-teleportation-based attacks were discussed.
After the introduction of quantum tagging [6], a few
other proposals of secure QPV protocols were discussed
in Refs. [5, 8, 9] 1. The possibility of “instantaneous mea-
surement” of non-local variables (observables) [10] leads
to the breaking down of security of such QPV protocols
by colluding adversaries performing teleportation-based
attacks [5, 11]. As it turns out, all of these proposed
schemes can be broken by colluding adversaries employ-
ing teleportation-based attacks [5, 7, 12, 13]. Various
other QPV protocols and attack strategies by adversaries
have been proposed [13–20] along with a security anal-
ysis with different physical constraints on the colluding
adversaries, among which Ref. [15] was the first to make
use of random oracle in the protocol. Some works have
also established lower bounds on the number of entangled
pairs required by the adversaries to breach the security
of certain QPV protocols [11, 13–15, 21].
An important feature of a QPV protocol is the lim-
ited time in which the prover can perform the computa-
tions and communicate with the verifiers. This suggests
the possibility of strengthening QPV protocols by taking
this time limit into account and negating the practical
feasibility of teleportation-based attacks by colluding ad-
versaries within the given time limit. As a consequence
of such limited-time constraints, it is possible that the
adversaries would need to share a very large amount of
resources (entangled pairs and quantum computational
power) between them for each round of the protocol to
breach security, while the verifiers would use only a few
low-dimensional quantum states for the protocol.
In this work, we introduce one such protocol by mod-
ifying previously-known protocols. Our protocol uses
single-qubit states from each verifier and makes use of
a classical random oracle held by the verifiers and the
prover. By using the best-known teleportation-based at-
tack strategies [5, 11], we show that the number of entan-
gled qubits that need to be shared among the adversaries
in order to breach security grows exponentially with the
size of the classical input of the random oracle. In Sec-
tion II, we introduce QPV and fix the notation. In Sec-
tion II A, we present known QPV protocols that make
use of single-qubit states. As a warm-up to the next Sec-
tion, we also introduce a modification by adding classical
1 The results of the US patent [6] appeared in publicly accessible
scientific literature in August 2010 [7], whereas, [8] appeared in
March 2010, [9] appeared in April 2010, and [5] appeared in
August 2010.
information into the protocols which tightens their secu-
rity. In Section III, we introduce novel QPV protocols
by adding a classical random oracle. These protocols ap-
pear to be practically secure under the attack of collud-
ing adversaries sharing a large amount of entangled pairs
(exponentially growing with the length of classical infor-
mation), even though each verifier sends just one qubit
to the prover to execute the QPV protocol. Finally, in
Section IV, we conclude.
II. QUANTUM POSITION VERIFICATION
The goal of a QPV protocol is for a set Ver(K) = {Vi}i,
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}, of K verifiers to authenticate the
spatial position pos of a prover P . The spatial positions
of all the parties involved are fixed in time. The prover P
is assumed to lie within the convex hull formed from the
spatial positions of the verifiers. For all i, let posi denote
the spatial position of Vi. All the verifiers can securely
communicate among themselves to decide on a list Item =
{itemi}i of items, where itemi corresponds to items that
are transmitted from Vi to pos. Each itemi comprises
arrays of classical bits and quantum states. The verifiers
and the prover agree upon the set Opn of operations that
the prover has to perform based on the elements of Item.
All the measurement operations and computations by P
are assumed to be instantaneous. The result Rslt at the
end of operations instructed in Opn is broadcast to all
the verifiers. The information communication, Item and
Rslt, between the prover and the verifiers is assumed to
take place at the speed c of light. For simplicity, we
set c = 1. Then the time taken for information to travel
between the verifiers and the prover is equal to the spatial
distance between them.
Now, suppose that there is a set Adv = {Ei}i of col-
luding adversaries, each Ei positioned at pos
′
i between
Vi and pos. These adversaries want to cheat the veri-
fiers by convincing them of being positioned at pos, even
though pos′i 6= pos for all i. We restrict the adver-
saries to make use of resources available only at their
positions pos′i for all i. However, they may share non-
local quantum resources, such as entanglement. They
are allowed to collude through classical communication
among each other. Classical communication among the
adversaries, and between them and the verifiers, is as-
sumed to be at the speed of light. We denote the Eu-
clidean distance between any two spatial positions posi
and pos by dis(posi, pos). Furthermore, we assume that
the spatial distance between Vi and pos is the same, i.e.,
dis(posi, pos) = d. If the verifiers transmit the infor-
mation {Item,Opn} at time t` towards the prover, then
the result Rslt has to arrive back to the verifers at time
t` + 2d. The verfiers accept the prover’s position creden-
tial only when the expected result is received from the
prover on time. Let us denote this 1−round scheme as
QPV[Ver(K),P(pos), Item,Opn,Rslt, d].
The security of a generic QPV protocol is generally
3analyzed using the completeness and soundness con-
ditions [2, 5]. QPV[Ver(K),P(pos), Item,Opn,Rslt, d] is
said to have perfect completeness if the verifiers al-
ways agree with an honest prover P . In other words,
if the verifiers accept the prover’s position credential
of being spatially located at pos with probability 1,
then the protocol is said to have perfect completeness.
QPV[Ver(K),P(pos), Item,Opn,Rslt, d] is said to be ε-
sound if for any coalition of adversaries {Ei}i spatially
located at pos′i 6= pos for all i and limited to resources
Res that are only locally available at these positions, the
verifiers accept with probability at most ε.
For our discussion, we consider quantum position veri-
fication protocols QPV[Ver(K),P(pos),Item,Opn,Rslt, d] in
one dimension (1-D). We constrain our discussion to
qubit systems. For simplicity of discussion, we assume
the protocol to have perfect completeness. For the 1-D
case, it is sufficient to let K = 2, so that we have two
verifiers, V0 and V1, spatially positioned at the two ends
of a line, and a prover P at the middle of the line denoted
pos, see Fig. 1. The spatial distance between V0 and V1
is 2d. The verifiers wish to verify that P is spatially lo-
cated at pos. Unfortunately, there are two adversaries,
E0 (between V0 and P ) and E1 (between V1 and P ) who
will try to fake P . Given the geometrical setting of the
verifiers and the prover, the optimal number of adver-
saries required to analyze the security of the protocol is
equal to the number of verifiers.
⊗
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FIG. 1. Schematic diagram for the 1-D QPV protocol
QPV[Ver(2),P(pos),Item,Opn,Rslt, d].
Let us denote the computational basis of a qubit sys-
tem by {|0〉, |1〉}. A two-qubit system in the state
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (1)
will be referred to as an EPR pair. Any two-qubit max-
imally entangled state is unitarily equivalent to an EPR
pair. The four Bell states are
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉),
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). (2)
The states {|Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉} form an orthonormal
basis for the Hilbert space of two-qubit systems. A Bell
measurement is defined to be a projective measurement
in this basis. We denote the qubit Hadamard transform
by H, which is defined by
H|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), (3)
H|1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). (4)
We let X, Y , and Z denote the Pauli operators, where
Z = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1| and X = HZH [22].
A. Protocols with single-qubit states
In this section, we discuss some known 1-D QPV pro-
tocols QPV[Ver(2),P(pos),Item,Opn,Rslt, d] and their se-
curity breaches that have been discussed in prior work
[2, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15]. For the breach of security, a single
EPR pair shared among the adversaries suffices. Then, as
a warm-up to the implementation of the classical random
oracle in the Section III A, we modify these protocols by
introducing a single bit of information, and discuss the
effect on the quantum resources of the adversaries that
are needed for breach of security.
1. One-qubit protocol
This protocol has been inspired by the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum-key-distribution (QKD)
protocol [23].
To verify the position of P , the following scheme is
employed:
1. The verifiers agree on random bits x, θ ∈ {0, 1}. V0
prepares a qubit in the state
|ψ〉 = Hθ|x〉 (5)
and sends it to P . V1 sends θ to P , so they arrive
at P at the same time. That is, item0 = {|ψ〉} and
item1 = {θ}.
2. As soon as |ψ〉 and θ arrive, P performs a measure-
ment in the basis {Hθ|0〉, Hθ|1〉}, and sends the
outcome x′ to both V0 and V1. The given measure-
ment consititutes Opn and x′ is the Rst.
3. If the verifiers receive x′ at the time consistent with
the position of P , and x′ = x, then they accept;
otherwise they reject.
4Now, suppose there are two adversaries, E0 (between V0
and P ) and E1 (between V1 and P ). Can they fake P?
Suppose that the adversaries share no entangled qubits,
although they may have qubits in their possession. When
V0 sends |ψ〉, E0 will intercept it before P does, but will
not be able to do Step 2, because she will have to wait
for θ to arrive first. By the time it arrives, it will be too
late to send any information to V1 (but not to V0).
The best strategy is the following, which is based on
minimum-error state discrimination [24, 25]. When E0
receives |ψ〉 from V0, she performs a measurement in the
basis
|0′〉 = cos pi
8
|0〉+sin pi
8
|1〉 , |1′〉 = − sin pi
8
|0〉+cos pi
8
|1〉
(6)
and sends the outcome of the measurement to E1. The
probability of success of this optimal strategy is
 = cos2
pi
8
=
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
≈ 0.85 (7)
As the above is repeated n times, the success probabil-
ity becomes n (exponentially small). Notice that the
adversaries are not able to make use of the classical in-
formation θ available to them. This information would
have been useful, had E0 received it before deciding on
what measurement to perform.
However, E0 can make use of θ when deciding on the
measurement, if the adversaries share entangled qubits,
because of the possibility of teleportation. Suppose the
adversaries share an EPR pair. Then they can fake P
following these steps.
1. Upon receiving |ψ〉, E0 teleports it to E1. In doing
so, E0 performs Bell measurements with outcome
k = k0k1, in binary notation. They determine the
state E1 receives (instantaneously) as
|φk〉 = Xk0Zk1 |ψ〉 (8)
Since |ψ〉 = Hθ|x〉, for θ = 0, |φk〉 is an eigenstate
of Z, whereas for θ = 1, |φk〉 is an eigenstate of
X = HZH. We easily obtain
HθZHθ|φk〉 = (−1)x⊕kθ |φk〉 (9)
E0 sends the results k of her Bell measurements to
E1.
2. At the same time, knowing θ (having received it
from V1), E1 measures H
θZHθ (i.e., Z, if θ = 0,
and X, if θ = 1), and obtains outcome (−1)x⊕kθ .
She immediately sends both θ and (−1)x⊕kθ to E0.
3. Upon receiving the classical informa-
tion {θ, (−1)x⊕kθ} from E1, E0 multiplies
(−1)x⊕kθ (−1)kθ = (−1)x to calculate x and send
the information to V0.
4. Upon receiving the classical information k from E0,
E1 multiplies (−1)x⊕kθ (−1)kθ = (−1)x to calculate
x and send the information to V1.
This strategy has 100% probability of success for the ad-
versaries. Thus a single EPR pair among the adversaries
is sufficient for breach of security.
2. Modified one-qubit protocol
The above conclusion on breach of security can be
avoided by upgrading |ψ〉 to a n-qubit state with n > 1.
In this case, if the adversaries share m EPR pairs, then
the probability of success for the adversaries is given by
 ≤ 2m cos2n pi8 , where the additional factor 2m is due
to the availability of the Hilbert space of the entangled
pairs. However, realizing such a protocol with multi-
qubit states |ψ〉 is experimentally challenging. Instead,
we can modify the above protocol by introducing an ad-
ditional classical bit of information. In the modified pro-
tocol, to verify the position of P , the following scheme is
used.
1. The verifiers agree on random x, θ0, θ1 ∈ {0, 1}. V0
prepares a qubit in the state
|ψ〉 = Hθ0·θ1 |x〉 (10)
and sends it to P , along with θ0. V1 sends θ1 to P ,
so they arrive at P at the same time.
2. As soon as |ψ〉 and θ0, θ1 arrive, P computes (clas-
sically) θ = θ0 · θ1, performs a measurement in the
basis {Hθ|0〉, Hθ|1〉}, and sends the outcome x′ to
both V0 and V1.
3. If the verifiers receive x′ at the time consistent with
the position of P , and x′ = x, then they accept;
otherwise they reject.
Unlike the previous protocol, adversaries with a prior
single pair of entangled qubits will not be able to break
the security of this modified protocol. This is because
E1 has insufficient information to perform the correct
measurement on her qubit. E1 can optimize her mea-
surement, but the adversaries can never achieve a 100%
success rate. The adversaries need at least 2 entangled
pairs.
Suppose that the adversaries share two EPR pairs, la-
beled 0 and 1, each in the Bell state (1). Then they can
fake P following these steps.
1. Upon receiving |ψ〉 and θ0, E0 teleports |ψ〉 to E1
using the EPR pair labeled θ0. In doing so, E0 per-
forms a Bell measurement with outcome k = k0k1,
in binary notation. The state E1 receives (instanta-
neously) is given by (8). E0 sends the results k, θ0
of her Bell measurement to E1.
2. At the same time, knowing θ1 (having received it
from V1), E1 measures Z on qubit 0 and H
θ1ZHθ1
(i.e., Z, if θ1 = 0, and X, if θ1 = 1) on qubit 1. She
obtains outcome (−1)x⊕kθ on the qubit belonging
to the EPR pair E0 used to teleport |ψ〉, and λ on
5the other qubit. She immediately sends both θ1
and ((−1)x⊕kθ , λ) to E0.
3. Upon receiving the classical information
{θ1, ((−1)x⊕kθ , λ)} from E1, E0 multiplies
(−1)x⊕kθ (−1)kθ = (−1)x to calculate x and send
the information to V0. She knows which of the two
outcomes λ is, because that is determined by θ0.
4. Upon receiving the classical information k and θ0
from E0, E1 multiplies (−1)x⊕kθ (−1)kθ = (−1)x to
calculate x and send the information to V1. Again,
she knows which of the two outcomes λ is, because
that is determined by θ0.
This strategy has 100% probability of success for the ad-
versaries.
3. Two-qubit protocol
This is a scheme making use of entanglement of two
qubits received by the prover, and is secure if the adver-
saries share no EPR pairs [19].
To verify the position of P , the following scheme mak-
ing use of two qubits is employed:
1. The verifiers agree on random x0, x1, θ ∈ {0, 1}. Vi
prepares a qubit in the state Hθ|xi〉 (i = 0, 1) and
sends it to P . Both states arrive at P at the same
time.
2. P performs a measurement projecting onto the
state |Ψ+〉 (2). If the measurement is successful,
then he sends z = 1, otherwise he sends z = 0.
3. The verifiers accept if the result z of P ’s measure-
ment is consistent with the states sent by them to
P . The verifiers receive z = 1 half of the time,
if they send the same state with θ = 0 (different
states with θ = 1), and always z = 0 if they send
different states with θ = 0 (same state with θ = 1).
It should be noted that it is advantageous for the verifiers
if P projects onto both |Ψ+〉 and |Ψ−〉, making it harder
for adversaries to mimic P ’s actions. It is straightforward
to extend the analysis presented here to this case. For
simplicity, we omit the discussion.
For the security analysis, first let us consider the case
when the adversaries do not share any entangled pairs.
E0 intercepts the qubit from V0 and measures it in the
{|nˆ1〉, |nˆ2〉} basis, where nˆ1 ⊥ nˆ2. Similarly, E1 inter-
cepts the qubit from V1 and measures it in the same
basis. They communicate their results to each other. If
they disagree, they report z = 1 to the verifiers half of
the time. If they agree, they report z = 0 to the verifiers.
The probability of error for the adversaries is
Perr =
1
4
1∑
θ=0
(|〈0|Hθ|nˆ1〉|2 + |〈1|Hθ|nˆ2〉|2)
× (|〈0|Hθ|nˆ2〉|2 + |〈1|Hθ|nˆ1〉|2) (11)
Let |nˆ1〉 = (α, β)T , |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, and |nˆ2〉 =
(−β∗, α∗)T . Then
Perr = |αβ|2 + 1
4
|α+ β|2|α− β|2 (12)
It is easy to see that
Perr =
1
4
+ |=α∗β|2 ≥ 1
4
. (13)
The error is minimized when, e.g., α = 1, β = 0. Corre-
spondingly, the probability of success is
 = 1− Perr ≤ 3
4
. (14)
This bound compares favorably to the result (7) for the
single-qubit protocol.
Next, suppose that the adversaries share a pair of
qubits in the state (1). Once E0 intercepts the qubit
from V0, she can perform a Bell measurement on her
qubit in the pair shared with E1 and the intercepted
qubit, projecting it onto one of the orthogonal states
{|Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉} (assuming unlimited technolog-
ical capabilities). E1 performs a similar measurement on
her half of the pair and the qubit she intercepts from V1.
They report the results to each other. They send z = 1
to the verifiers, if E0 measures |Ψ+〉 and E1 measures
|Φ+〉.
Since
V0E0〈Ψ+|V1E1〈Φ+|Φ+〉E0E1 = V0V1〈Ψ+| (15)
their operation is equivalent to the prover’s measurement,
and therefore they have 100% probability of success.
4. Modified two-qubit protocol
Let us introduce two classical bits of information into
the protocol, similar to the modified one-qubit protocol.
The steps of the protocol are as follows:
1. The verifiers agree on random x0, x1, θ, y0, y1 ∈
{0, 1}. Vi prepares a qubit in the state Hθ|xi〉 and
sends it to P , along with yi (i ∈ {0, 1}). Here,
itmi = {yi, Hθ|xi〉}, for i ∈ {0, 1}. Both states
arrive at P at the same time.
2. P computes (classically) y = y0 ·y1, and applies Hy
to each of the states he receives. Then he performs
a measurement projecting onto the state |Ψ+〉 (2),
and signals z = 1 or 0 to the verifiers, depending
on whether his measurement was successful or not.
Without prior shared entanglement, the adversaries have
a success probability given by (14), as before. However,
they are no longer able to take advantage of a single
shared EPR pair, because they do not have the classical
information needed to mimic step 2, and perform the
6correct Bell measurements. Therefore, they need at least
two shared EPR pairs for a security breach.
It appears that the adversaries need a larger number
of entangled pairs. Suppose that the adversaries share 5
maximally entangled pairs labeled as a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4},
each in the Bell state (1). Then they can try to fake P
following these steps:
1. Upon receiving Hθ|x0〉 and y0, E0 teleports the
state to E1 using the EPR pair labeled a = 0. In
doing so, E0 performs a Bell measurement, and E1
receives the state
Xk0Zk1Hθ|x0〉 . (16)
She also sends the classical information k = k0k1,
as well as y0 to E1.
2. Upon receiving Hθ|x1〉 and y1, E1 teleports the
state to E0 using the EPR pair labeled a = 2y1+1.
E1 receives
Xk
′
0Zk
′
1Hθ|x1〉 . (17)
She also teleports back to E0 the state (16) using
the EPR pair labeled a = 2y1+2. Thus, E0 receives
the state Xk0+k
′′
0 Zk1+k
′′
1Hθ|x0〉, which can be sim-
plified, if E0 applies X
k0Zk1 (since k is known to
E0) to
Xk
′′
0 Zk
′′
1Hθ|x0〉 . (18)
She also sends the classical information y1 to E0.
3. E0 applies H
y0 to the channels a = 3, 4, thus effec-
tively applying Hy (y = y0 · y1) to the states she
received from E1. She then performs a Bell mea-
surement on each of the pairs labeled (1, 2) and
(3, 4). In each case, she reports success to E1, if
the outcome is |Ψ+〉 (2).
4. Upon receiving y0 and the “success” report from
E0, E1 reports z = 0 or 1 to V1, accordingly, know-
ing which pair of channels contains the teleported
states. At the same time, upon receiving y1 from
E1, E0 learns the pair of channels containing the
teleported states, and reports z = 0 or 1, accord-
ingly, to V0.
The above protocol can only succeed if k′ = k′′ = 0,
which occurs with probability 116 . The adversaries can
increase their odds at the expense of adding EPR pairs.
A large number of EPR pairs are needed for 100 % success
rate [5].
III. PROTOCOLS WITH SINGLE-QUBIT
STATES AND CLASSICAL RANDOM ORACLE
In this section, we present new schemes for the task of
quantum position verification. Taking cue from known
protocols discussed in Section II, we would like to have
a protocol in which the operations to be performed
by an honest prover would require practically large
amount of EPR pairs to be shared between them for
any be simulated by the colluding adversaries employ-
ing best known teleportation-based attacks [11]. Here,
we present 1-D quantum position verification protocols
QPV[Ver(2),P(pos),Item,Opn,Rslt, d] where we make use
of classical random oracle accessible to all involved par-
ties.
A. One-qubit protocol with a classical random
oracle
This is similar to the protocol in Section II A 2 but with
additional (classical) bits of information. This scheme is
variant of a protocol discussed in Ref. [15]. Each party
has access to a classical random oracle,
f : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1} . (19)
To verify the position of P , the following scheme is used.
1. The verifiers agree on random x ∈ {0, 1}, and ran-
dom n-bit strings θ0,θ1 ∈ {0, 1}n. V0 prepares a
qubit in the state
|ψ〉 = Hw|x〉 , w = f(θ0,θ1) (20)
and sends it to P , along with θ0. V1 sends θ1 to P ,
so they arrive at P at the same time.
2. As soon as |ψ〉 and θ0,θ1 arrive, P computes (clas-
sically) w = f(θ0,θ1), performs a measurement in
the basis {Hw|0〉, Hw|1〉}, and sends the outcome
x′ to both V0 and V1.
3. If the verifiers receive x′ at the time consistent with
the position of P , and x′ = x, then they accept;
otherwise they reject.
Even though only a single qubit is needed to run this
protocol, to break its security, it appears that the adver-
saries need 2n entangled pairs. Suppose the adversaries
share 2n maximally entangled pairs, i.e. EPR pairs, la-
beled as a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n− 1}, each in the Bell state (1).
Then they can fake P following these steps:
1. Upon receiving |ψ〉 and θ0, E0 teleports |ψ〉 to E1
using the EPR pair labeled a = θ0. In doing
so, E0 performs a Bell measurement with outcome
k = k0k1, in binary notation. The state E1 re-
ceives (instantaneously) is given by (8). E0 sends
the result k to E1.
2. At the same time, E1, knowing θ1, measures
Hf(a,θ1)ZHf(a,θ1) on qubits belonging to a-labeled
EPR pairs. E1 obtains outcomes λ = (λ0, λ1, . . . )
with λθ0 = (−1)x⊕kw on the qubit that E0 used
to perform teleportation. E1 immediately sends
(θ1,λ) to E0.
73. Upon receiving the classical information (θ1,λ)
from E1, E0 computes w = f(θ0,θ1), and
λθ0(−1)kw = (−1)x to determine x, and sends x
to V0. E0 knows which qubits the components of λ
correspond to, because they are determined by θ0.
4. Upon receiving the classical information k and θ0
from E0, E1 computes w = f(θ0,θ1) and multi-
plies (−1)x⊕kw(−1)kw = (−1)x to determine x, and
sends x to V1. Again, E1 knows which qubits the
components of λ correspond to, because they are
determined by θ0, which she just received.
If E0 and E1 share m EPR pairs between them, and
0 ≤ m ≤ 2n, then their exists a scheme that gives lower
bound on the probability with which they can succeed
in cheating verifiers to be max{m2n , cos2 pi8 }. This ob-
servation follows from the discussion above and in Sec-
tion II A 1.
B. Two-qubit protocol with classical random oracle
We allow each party to have access to the classical
random oracle (19). The steps of this protocol are as
follows:
1. The verifiers agree on random x0, x1, θ ∈ {0, 1},
and n-digit random numbers y0,y1 ∈ {0, 1}n. Vi,
for all i ∈ {0, 1}, prepares a qubit in the state
Hθ|xi〉, where H is the Hadamard matrix, and
sends it to P , along with yi (i ∈ {0, 1}). Here,
itmi = {yi, Hθ|xi〉} for i ∈ {0, 1}. Both states as
well as the classical information arrive at P at the
same time.
2. P computes (classically) w = f(y0,y1), and applies
Hw to each of the states he received. Then he per-
forms a Bell measurement projecting onto the state
|Ψ+〉 (2). If the measurement is successful, then he
sends z = 1, otherwise he sends z = 0.
3. The verifiers accept if the result z of P ’s measure-
ment is consistent with the states sent by them to
P .
Scheme to break the security of the protocol
A small number of pairs of entangled qubits shared by
the adversaries will not break the security. In fact, it
appears that the adversaries need an exponentially large
number of entangled pairs. Suppose that the adversaries
share 2n+1 + 1 maximally entangled pairs labeled as a =
0, and (b0, b1), where b0 ∈ {0, 1}, b1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1},
each in the Bell state (1). Then they can fake P following
these steps:
1. Upon receiving Hθ|x0〉 and y0, E0 teleports the
state to E1 using the EPR pair labeled a = 0. In
doing so, E0 performs a Bell measurement, and E1
receives the state
Xk0Zk1Hθ|x0〉 . (21)
She also sends the classical information k = k0k1,
as well as y0 to E1.
2. Upon receiving Hθ|x1〉 and y1, E1 teleports the
state to E0 using the EPR pair labeled (b0, b1) =
(0,y1). E1 receives
Xk
′
0Zk
′
1Hθ|x1〉 . (22)
She also teleports back to E0 the state (16) us-
ing the EPR pair labeled (b0, b1) = (1,y1). Thus,
E0 receives the state X
k0+k
′′
0 Zk1+k
′′
1Hθ|x0〉, which
can be simplified, if E0 applies X
k0Zk1 (since k is
known to E0) to
Xk
′′
0 Zk
′′
1Hθ|x0〉 . (23)
She also sends the classical information y1 to E0.
3. E0 computes f(y0, b1) classically and applies
Hf(y0,b1) to each of the (b0, b1) channels, for b0 =
0, 1, thus effectively applying the desired Hf(y0,y1)
to the states she received from E1. She then per-
forms a Bell measurement on each of the pairs la-
beled (b0, b1), b0 = 0, 1. For each value of b1, she
reports success to E1, if the outcome is |Ψ+〉 (2).
4. Upon receiving y0 and the “success” report from
E0, E1 reports z = 0 or 1 to V1, accordingly, know-
ing which pair of channels contains the teleported
states. At the same time, upon receiving y1 from
E1, E0 learns the pair of channels containing the
teleported states, and reports z = 0 or 1, accord-
ingly, to V0.
The above protocol can only succeed if k′ = k′′ = 0,
which occurs with probability 116 . The adversaries can
increase their odds at the expense of adding EPR pairs.
An exponentially large number of EPR pairs are needed
for 100 % success rate [5]. Thus, the security of the proto-
col is breached with a number of EPR pairs shared by the
adversaries that grows exponentially with the number of
classical bits used in the classical oracle f . It is remark-
able that the amount of quantum resources needed by
the adversaries in this strategy grows exponentially with
the length of the classical information, while the verifiers
only need two independent qubits for their protocol.
It should be pointed out that it follows from the dis-
cussion in Refs. [13, 18] that whenever the function f
(classical oracle) parametrizing the protocol can be com-
puted by a Turing machine using logarithmic space, the
adversaries can attack these protocols using EPR pairs
whose number grows polynomially with the number of
classical bits in f . Hence, it is crucial to ascertain that
f is a random oracle.
8IV. CONCLUSION
We introduced new schemes for quantum position ver-
ification protocols by introducing a classical random or-
acle. We discussed the strategy for security breach by
the adversaries sharing EPR pairs based on currently
best known teleportation-based attacks. It is known that
the entanglement distribution over long distances and the
storage of entangled qubits are technologically challeng-
ing [3, 26]. The interaction between the quantum system
and the environment can cause loss of information as a re-
sult of decoherence, dissipation, or decay phenomena [27–
30]. Quantum memories are essential to overcome such
losses caused by the environment for the preservation of
the entanglement between the quantum systems for the
duration longer than the decoherence period [3, 4, 28].
We showed that while the verifiers need to make use of
only one or two independent qubits for the verification
task, the adversaries need an exponential amount of EPR
pairs, depending on the number of classical bits that the
verifiers make use of. In this sense, we state that the
schemes we have presented are technologically feasible
and practically secure.
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